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I. INTRODUCTION
A good place to begin is with the recent revelation regarding the Bush
administration. In December 2005, The New York Times reported that President
Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to secretly electroni-
cally eavesdrop on certain domestic conversations of United States citizens
without first obtaining a court order,' contrary to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (FISA) of 1978.2 In other words, the executive department evi-
dently was violating the law. Although Bush defended the practice as necessary
to combat the War on Terror, done with congressional approval,3 and authorized
by his Article II powers, the argument is specious and exemplifies the arro-
gance of his administration. In fact, warrantless wiretapping in foreign intelli-
gence cases due to expediency is unnecessary; an "unforced error" as one com-
mentator called it.4 First, FISA allows emergency surveillance for up to 72
1 David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2005 at 1.
2 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005).
3 See S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (authorizing the use of force after the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks).
4 This Week with George Stephanopolous (ABC television broadcast Dec. 18, 2005) (com-
ment by George Will).
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hours without a warrant. Second, the statute requires only a showing of prob-
able cause that foreign intelligence information is being sought, not probable
cause that a crime has been committed as in the case of a conventional warrant.
6
Third, the FISA court, the special court established by the Act to review war-
rants requests, has turned down only a handful among thousands of applica-
7tions. To circumvent the legislation set up for the purpose reveals at least a
belief in the irrelevance of Congress, if not contempt for the Article I body.
This is the gist of Senator Robert C. Byrd's polemical Losing America
aimed not only at the Bush administration, but also at the United States Senate
for its complacency in the face of the onslaught. The Constitution of the United
States somewhat imperfectly set up a system of checks and balances to avoid the
concentration of power in the hands of any one branch of government, a system
that Chief Justice John Marshall helped to refine in his 1803 decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison.
8
Marbury actually involved a clash between the executive branch,
newly-elected President Thomas Jefferson, and the legislative branch, the Con-
gress under former President John Adams. As students of history and constitu-
tional law will recall, after losing the Presidency and control of Congress in the
election of 1800, the lame duck Federalists tried to retain power by stacking the
judiciary in the Circuit Courts Act and the Organic Act, both passed in February
1801, shortly before Jefferson was inaugurated. William Marbury became im-
mersed in the battle when Jefferson instructed his new Secretary of State, James
Madison, not to deliver his yet undelivered commission as justice of the peace
of the District of Columbia. When Marbury filed his action for a writ of man-
damus in the United States Supreme Court, requesting the Court to order Madi-
son to deliver his commission, Chief Justice Marshall got his chance to enter the
separation of powers debate. While ruling against Marbury procedurally (Mar-
shall held unconstitutional the statute granting the Court original mandamus
jurisdiction) and avoiding a constitutional confrontation with Jefferson, Mar-
shall assumed the power of final judicial review over both acts of the executive
branch and Congress. The system of checks and balances had been completed.
The rest of the country's political history has been largely dominated by a power
struggle between the branches, sometimes involving the judicial branch 9 and
often arbitrated by the judiciary.' 0
5 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 (1978).
6 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (1978).
7 Anita Ramasastry, Why the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Was Right to Re-
buke the Justice Department, FindLaw, Sep. 4, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/Ramasastry/20020904.html.
8 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182
(1943); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996);
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 14,
393 U.S. 233 (1968) (dealing with congressional power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal
[Vol. 108
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It is the breakdown of checks and balances that Mr. Byrd laments, a
failure based both on his distaste for the inexperienced yet arrogant presidency
of George W. Bush, and a cowed and cowardly United States Senate in the af-
termath of September 11, 2001.
Byrd describes the presidential phenomenon this way:
But 9/11, that terrible day, provided a way to salvage what was
fast becoming a themeless, floundering presidency. Here was
an event that blurred the spectacle of a rising deficit and a flag-
ging economy and substituted a powerful theme and focus for
Bush's presidency. The horrendous loss of life; the shock,
trauma, and fear among the American people; the surge of pa-
triotism; and the sense of common danger: all of these quickly
catapulted this rather inarticulate, directionless man-who had
come to his august position after a national election that was a
virtual tie, and a strange decision by the United States Supreme
Court regarding how votes were counted in a state governed by
the candidate's brother-to a level of power granted to few men
in all of history.' 1
Byrd is not much kinder with his colleagues in the Senate. Speaking in
regard to the Senate's passage of the war resolution on Iraq, which he refers to
as "a despicable grant of authority," Byrd writes:
Never in my half century of congressional service had the
United States Senate proved unworthy of its great name. What
would the framers have thought? In this terrible show of weak-
ness, the Senate left an indelible stain upon its own escutcheon.
courts). Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (power of Congress to vest Article III judicial power
in non-Article III bodies). United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege from
court orders).
10 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential sei-
zure of steel mills unconstitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating congres-
sional veto of Executive deportation decisions); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (execu-
tive functions cannot be imposed on Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress);
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (Line Item Veto Act violates Bicameralism and Pre-
sentment Clauses).
11 SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, LOSING AMERICA, 20 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2004) (Herein-
after cited as LOSING AMERICA).
2006]
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Having revered the Senate during my service for more than
forty years, I was never pained so much.'
2
Senator Byrd focuses on two principal areas in his lament of the loss of
congressional authority-the power to declare war and provide for the common
defense, and the power over appropriations, i.e, the power of the sword and the
purse. Also, throughout his critique in the shift in power from Congress to the
executive branch, he is troubled by the secrecy and insulation surrounding the
White House.
II. POWER OVER APPROPRIATIONS
Regarding the purse, Byrd is clearly upset. The United States Constitu-
tion provides in Article I, Section 8 that, "The Congress shall have the Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ... 13 and
Section 9 of that same Article provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the public Money
shall be published from time to time."1 4 As Byrd points out, this control of ap-
propriations given to Congress was intended by the framers as a check on ex-
ecutive power.
Following five weeks of acrimony contesting the election of 2004,
George W. Bush took office on a spirit of cooperation and talk of bipartisanship,
claiming to be a "uniter and not a divider." Regardless, his administration al-
most immediately ramrodded through Congress a massive $2 trillion dollar tax
cut bill mostly benefitting the wealthy that turned a hard-won $2.5 trillion dollar
surplus handed over by President Clinton into a $400 billion dollar deficit by
2004.15 As Senator Byrd emphasizes, this entire process took place without a
Budget Committee report and with no markup in the Budget Committee, which
meant that there was no opportunity to offer amendments by either side.' 6 The
massive cuts then were rammed through Congress by a procedure known as
"reconciliation" which imposes very tight time limits on debate and amend-
ments. 17 Additionally, Byrd writes:
12 Id. at 176.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
15 LOSING AMERICA at 27-28; Jonathan Weisman, The Tax Cut Pendulum and the Pit,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dyn/articles/A/6134.20040ct7.html.
16 LOSING AMERICA at 29.
17 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 108
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Even worse, the tax cuts held an enormous lie-deliberately
disguising their true size and effect on the budget by backload-
ing them. Over 72 percent of the revenue losses from the tax
cuts were set to occur between fiscal years 2007 and 2011,
when George W. Bush would be well off the political stage.
Those who calculate such matters tell us that some $344 billion
per year in tax givebacks will be in place by 2011. Also in
place will be deficits in the Social Security trust fund and the
Medicare trust fund-right around that 2010-15 time period.
One has to marvel at the utter recklessness of the Bush
agenda.
18
Thus, what Byrd is telling us is that Congress not only abdicated its re-
sponsibility over fiscal policy, but also sacrificed its ability, and obligation, to
make responsible appropriations decisions in the future-to the tune of $2 tril-
lion dollars. This massive loss of money comes at a time when baby boomers
will start to retire at the beginning of the next decade, and there will be huge
demands on, and deficits in, Social Security and Medicare; a "train wreck" as
Byrd describes it.
In addition to benefitting the wealthy, it is plausible to assume that the
tax cuts were designed to starve government and, with new deficits, to concomi-
tantly require cuts in benefit programs. This is exactly what is happening now.
Not only could a lot of good things been done with that money-including
AIDS and cancer research-there would have been no need to cut benefit pro-
grams for the poorer members of our society. The Bush tax cuts and budgets
are nothing less than a transfer of wealth; a not so subtle effort to dismantle the
New Deal.
To this financial morass must be added the cost of the war in Iraq and
the unexpected need for hurricane relief. Congress appropriated $357 billion
from 2002 through the end of 2005 for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and
related security issues, and it has been estimated that the cost to the U.S. econ-
omy over the next decade could be anywhere for $657 billion to $2 trillion dol-
lars for the Iraq war alone.' 9 As Byrd sees it, all this paints a picture of both a
reckless administration and an irresponsible handling by Congress of its power
of the purse (and the sword).
Senator Byrd is also highly critical of other efforts of the Bush admini-
stration to intrude on appropriations authority. He cites two examples: requests
for unallocated funds and transfer authority-the right to transfer funds between
allocations provided by Congress. After 9/11, the President requested "such
sums as may be necessary to respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States
ig Id. at 28.
19 Kevin G. Hall, Final cost of Iraq war could reach $2 trillion, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan.
14, 2006, at 6A.
20061
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that occurred on September 11, 2001.,, 20 In Byrd's words, "[n]o amounts or
purposes were mentioned and no reporting or notification requirements listed.'
This request was rejected, but Congress later did provide $20 billion in a $40
billion supplemental spending bill that could be allocated by the President after
"consultation" with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The
President spent the $20 billion, but Byrd says "the consultation process was, at
best, perfunctory." In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Bush budgets requested
the authority to transfer 5 percent of all appropriations (as much as $38 billion)
among various appropriations accounts. Again this was rejected, but again
Congress nevertheless provided $2 billion in transfer authority in the April
2003, supplemental military spending bill for Iraq and $3 billion in transfer
funds in the November 2003, supplemental for Iraq. Congress also provided a
$15.7 billion transfer account in something called the Iraq Freedom Fund. Byrd
rails:
I have never seen anything like it in my fifty-two years in the
House and the Senate. The Bush team never tires in its drive to
usurp congressional control of spending. Take military spend-
ing. Wrapped in "patriotism" and platitudes, a Rumsfeldian ar-
rogance driven by a White House dominated by superhawks
virtually sneers at the legislative branch. In fact, Congress can
usually be counted on to rubber-stamp nearly any proposal for
spending labeled "defense.,
22
Byrd's criticism of congressional abdication of power is not reserved
for Congress during the Bush administration. Byrd has consistently been a
harsh critic of the line item veto, which would allow a President to sign an ap-
propriations bill into law and then strike out any parts of that same law. Al-
though the line item veto is defended as a means of controlling pork barrel legis-
lation and controlling the deficit, Senator Byrd sees it as a naked grab for power
by the executive. As he explains, the line item veto does not give the President
that much power over federal spending because it applied to only one-third of
the federal budget. Mandatory programs and entitlements, where most of the
growth occurs, were not subject to the "line out" authority. Byrd believes the
real reason why Presidents since Ronald Reagan have clamored for this veto is
to control Congress-to trade threatened cancellation of benefits to various con-
gressional districts in exchange for a vote on a bill, program, or nomination fa-
vored by the President. For example, "Senator Byrd, if you want my support for
locating the FBI fingerprint center in West Virginia, I need your vote on my
20 LOSING AMERICA at 63.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 64-65.
[Vol. 108
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Supreme Court nominee." He shudders to think of the line item veto in the
hands of Lyndon Johnson.23
When the Senate passed the Line Item Veto Act in 1995 (which Byrd
says "represented a gross self-mutilation of its power over the purse" 24) Byrd led
five other members of Congress in filing suit the day after it went into effect to
challenge its constitutionality. When this suit originally reached the Supreme
Court, it was dismissed for lack of standing, the Court concluding that the mem-
bers of Congress had not suffered sufficient personal injury.25 Nonetheless,
when President Clinton exercised the new authority to cancel a provision of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, affecting health care debt in New York, and two
provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, affecting potato growers, the
affected parties (who clearly had standing) filed suit again challenging the line
item veto, and the Supreme Court eventually declared it a violation of the Bi-
cameralism and Presentment Clauses of the Constitution. 6 Byrd thanks the
Court for preserving checks and balances and saving Congress from themselves.
We shall see.
III. THE WAR POWERS
There is even more consternation over Congress' sacrifice of its war
powers after September 11. Senator Byrd initially praises President Bush's re-
sponse to the attack, saying, "[w]ho can forget the stirring images of our young
President standing among firefighters and Port Authority workers in the rubble
and soot that had been the trade towers? He spoke to them from his heart, using
a bullhorn to be heard. He rallied a nation, using defiant words to tamp down
the fear. Even as we mourned, our hearts were lifted up."'27 Although Byrd also
thinks Bush was right to attack the Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, he bristles
early at the cowboy "Wanted: Dead or Alive," "good vs. evil," "us and them,"
"you're either with us or against us" rhetoric. He does not view it as the stuff of
statecraft.
Noteworthy at this stage on the War on Terror is that after 9/11 Bush
initially wanted unlimited power to engage in preemptive strikes against nations
harboring terrorists. The Bush administration wanted language that would have
allowed the President to use the armed forces to "to deter and prevent any future
acts of terrorism and aggression against the United States. ' 28 Byrd opines,
"This would have amounted to an unlimited grant of authority to the White
House to attack any country it wished to attack as long as some suspicion had
23 Id. at 42.
24 Id. at41.
25 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
26 See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
27 LOSING AMERICA at 83.
28 Id. at 87.
20061
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arisen of future aggression or there was some connection to terrorism which
might be aimed at the United States., 29 Though the Senate grant of authority to
the President in S.J. Res. 23 was much narrower, speaking in the past tense,
Bush's signing statement said the resolution recognizes "the authority of the
president under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of ter-
rorism against the United States., 30 This language was much broader than that
in the resolution. Bush was clearly asserting the right to act preemptively.
The next alarm comes in Bush's State of the Union address on January
29, 2002. This included the infamous reference to the "axis of evil," a thinly
veiled threat to attack Iraq, Iran, and North Korea before they become a threat to
the United States. This shortly was followed by the release in September 2002
of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy (NSS), a 33-page
document completely revamping U.S. foreign and military policy. The docu-
ment featured preemption to deal with states harboring terrorists or trying to
produce weapons of mass destruction, an emphasis on the maintenance and use
of U.S. military might to deal with international problems, and unilateralism.
This should have come as no surprise. A group called the Project for a New
American Century in early 1998 had urged President Clinton to remove Saddam
Hussein from power. Of the eighteen people who signed that letter, eleven held
posts in the Bush administration when the Iraq War began - Elliot Abrams,
Richard L. Armitage, John Bolton, Paul Dobriansky, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard
Perle, Peter W. Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider Jr., Paul
Wolfowitz, and Robert Zoellick,31 many now-familiar names.
Other than preemption, the other principal aspect of Bush foreign and
military policy, as stated in the 2002 NSS report and identified by Senator Byrd,
is unilateralism, a policy which broke with a long history of American diplo-
macy. Byrd cites as recent examples foreign policy under Presidents Kennedy,
Clinton, and George H.W. Bush. From Losing America:
What further alarmed me about the Bush saber-rattling was a
pronounced tendency among the Bushies toward unilateralism
that bode ill for the expansive military adventures so dear to the
neoconservative heart. In December of 2001, President Bush
had announced his intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, arguing that tests on the missile defense system
were unduly constrained. The 1972 Biological Weapons Con-
vention, a ratified multilateral treaty which prohibits countries
from developing biological weapons, had been derailed by the
Bush administration's refusal to negotiate on a draft protocol.
The State Department had postponed discussions until 2006.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 88.
31 Id. at 147.
[Vol. 108
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One reason cited for delaying the draft protocol was a fear that
verification inspections in the United States might force phar-
maceutical companies to reveal trade secrets. Further, the In-
ternational Criminal Court, a signed but not ratified multilateral
treaty creating a permanent United Nations tribunal to try indi-
viduals on war crimes or crimes against humanity, faced oppo-
sition by the Bush administration because it might have an im-
pact on legal protections for military personnel overseas. The
Bushies even opposed a multilateral treaty to standardize export
controls aimed at trafficking in small arms like pistols, machine
guns, grenades, and mortars; unbelievably, the White House
trotted out the excuse that these efforts were aimed at undermin-
ing the Constitution's Second Amendment. The Bush admini-
stration has made virtually no attempt to improve the Kyoto
Protocol after Bush announced opposition to it on March 13,
2001. As for global warming, this administration not only es-
chews multilateral efforts, it virtually ignores the phenome-
non.
32
Most pronounced here is the administration's attitude toward the U.N.
Since the organization was founded in 1945, each new president has promptly
appointed an ambassador to represent the United States in the U.N., usually an-
nouncing the nominees for secretary of state and U.N. ambassador at the same
time. Bush waited six weeks after making Colin Powell secretary of state be-
fore nominating John Negroponte to represent the United States in the U.N.
Along with other acts of unilateralism, this slight caused the United States the
diplomatic embarrassment of losing its seat on the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mission, which it did not regain until 2002. Byrd says "the Bush administration
treats the U.N. as an unnecessary encumbrance. Outright hostility to the organi-
zation runs right through many highly placed Bush officials....", He then cites
as an example John Bolton, then the undersecretary of state for arms control and
international security affairs (and now U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations)
as saying, "If the U.N. secretariat in New York lost ten stories it wouldn't make
a bit of difference." 34 Not much more needs to be said. In fact, it is surprising
that the Bush administration paid as much attention to the U.N. before the "coa-
lition of the willing" invaded Iraq without the U.N.'s blessing. The fact that
U.N. nuclear arms inspectors were involved and some deference was given to a
more cautious Colin Powell probably offers the explanation.
All of this, of course, leads up to what Byrd opposed and vigorously
criticizes-the surrender to the President by Congress of its power to declare
32 Id. at 168.
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war. He describes a Senate in a frenzy to avoid being labeled unpatriotic with
an attitude toward the Iraq war resolution of "get[ting] the vote behind us." As
Senator Byrd notes there are seven clauses in Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution which vest war powers in Congress. The document was specifically de-
signed that way as a check to prevent a president from waging war on his own.
Ignoring the lessons of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which led to the war
in Vietnam, the Senate gave Bush a "blank check" to use U.S. military power as
he pleased if it could be connected to Iraq. The resolving portion of H.J. Reso-
lution 114, which became Public Law 107-243 on October 16, 2002, provided in
Section 3:
(a) Authorization - The President is authorized to use the armed
forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate in order to-
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions regarding Iraq.35
Unlike the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, this one had no sunset provision.
And, unlike many less important bills, the Senate spent less than a week debat-
ing whether to give this war power to the President. Only twenty-three Senators
voted against what Byrd calls "this despicable grant of authority." Byrd writes,
With these words and for the foreseeable future, we were giving
Bush sole discretion to employ the full military might of the
United States whenever he pleased-to attack Iraq or any other
country he could connect to the "threat" posed by Iraq. This
was a "blank check" as to the use of military power.
It amounted to a complete evisceration of the congressional pre-
rogative to declare war, and an outrageous abdication of respon-
sibility to hand such unfettered discretion to this callow and
reckless president. Never in my view, had America been led by
such a dangerous head of state-who believed in preemptive
war as a way to deal with global terrorism, who preferred uni-
lateralism to international cooperation, who saw little use in
consultation or public debate, and whose inner circle of advisors
basically viewed Congress with contempt.36
35 Id. at 167.
36 Id. at 167-68.
[Vol. 108
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Byrd again, after speaking of congressional powers to declare war,
Yet the power of Congress to declare war-as envisioned by the
framers and outlined in the Constitution-now lies in a tepid or
dormant state. Timid legislators, aggressive presidents, and an
unmindful and unfocused American public have paved the way
for that which the framers of the Constitution obviously and
carefully tried to avoid: presidential initiation of wars.
3 7
As the Senator suggests in Losing America, and as we now know, Con-
gress relinquished its power to declare war based on a bunch of what he calls
"truth-twistings:" Iraq's tie to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, evidence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and Iraq's threat of developing nuclear
weapons. The final third of the book deals with the War in Iraq, and how it was
sold to the American public and Congress, Byrd noting that Bob Woodward's
book, Bush at War,38 reveals that Bush planned his attack on Iraq in December
2001. He concludes with a plea for Congress "to curtail the open-ended author-
ity it so blindly gave to this dangerous president in October of 2002. The awe-
some power to commit this nation to war must be taken back from the hands of
a single individual-the President of the United States-and returned to the
people's representatives in Congress as the framers intended. No president must
ever again be granted such license with our troops or our treasure.' 39 In one of
the eight speeches from the Senate floor which are included at the end, Byrd
states:
As I watched the president's fighter jet swoop down onto the
deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, I could not help
but contrast the reported simple dignity of President Lincoln at
Gettysburg with the flamboyant showmanship of President




Another aspect of the Bush administration which the Senator laments is
secrecy, which undermines Congress' oversight role. He cites many examples.
"[I]n October 2001, the White House issued a memorandum stating that all in-
telligence briefings would henceforth be conducted by six members of the cabi-
net (FBI and CIA directors, the secretaries of defense, state, and treasury, and
the attorney general) and be made available only to eight members of Congress
37 Id. at 168.
38 BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR (Simon & Schuster 2002).
39 LOSING AMERICA at 214.
40 Id. at 251.
2006]
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(the House and Senate party leadership and Intelligence Committees).' When
members of Congress rebelled at this, it was dropped. Also, the Justice De-
partment has consistently withheld specifically requested information about
governmental action under the Patriot Act, and members of Congress find it
difficult to obtain classified information even when it is part of their committee
duties. In October 2001, the attorney general issued a memorandum instructing
agencies to limit public access to information under the Freedom of Information
Act. In November 2001, Bush signed an executive order, which Byrd calls
"sweeping and lawless," limiting indefinitely public access to presidential pa-
pers, apparently in direct contravention of the Presidential Records Act of 1978,
which makes presidential papers available to the public twelve years after the
president leaves office. Senator Byrd also notes that the White House consis-
tently censors reports and intelligence briefings. More troubling, after the Sep-
tember 11 th attacks, the White House has run a "shadow government," outside
the White House on two East Coast locations, to assume command in the case of
a national emergency. This shadow government consists of only one branch,
the executive.
V. CONCLUSION
One particular example of secrecy catches Byrd's eye-Vice President
Dick Cheney's National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG). Some
members of Congress had asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to look
at the process the NEPDG used to develop national energy policy. Although
Comptroller General of the GAO, David Walker, made a rather innocuous re-
quest, asking only for disclosure of the participants, dates, subjects, and loca-
tions of the meetings, and the costs incurred, the Vice President claimed that the
GAO lacked authority to examine the records of the NEPDG, forcing Walker
and the GAO to go to court to obtain the records, but the case was dismissed for
lack of standing. Nevertheless, two groups from opposite ideological poles-
Judicial Watch, a conservative watchdog group, and the Sierra Club-filed law-
suits to obtain the records under the federal Freedom of Information Act. The
suits were combined and the plaintiffs prevailed before the District Court 42 and a
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.43
This is where the separation of powers/checks-and-balances debate
takes on a new twist, and again raises the specter of Chief Justice Marshall. In a
couple of places in Losing America, Senator Byrd praises the courts and hopes
they will continue to save Congress from itself as it sacrifices power to the
president. Specifically, and as indicated earlier, he mentions the line item veto
debate and thanks the United States Supreme Court for saving congressional
41 Id. at 68-69.
42 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002).
43 In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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power in Clinton v. New York. 44 When discussing the executive's detention of
enemy-combatants, Byrd again hopes the courts will step in to prevent an arro-
gant assertion of presidential power. His wishes to some extent were fulfilled in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,45 holding that "due process demands that a citizen held in
the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for the detention before a neutral decisionmaker, ' 46 and
Rasul v. Bush,47 holding that federal judges have jurisdiction to consider habeas
petitions from Guantanamo detainees who argue they are being held unlaw-
fully.48 The Court also recently heard oral argument on the issue of whether the
administration could try the detainees in military tribunals.49
Looking at the larger picture, however, the Supreme Court has not
saved Congress from its separation of powers battle with the Bush administra-
tion. Reverting to the lawsuit challenging the secrecy of Vice President Che-
ney's National Energy Policy Development Group, the Supreme Court eventu-
ally ruled against the plaintiff's freedom of information act request, 50 reversing
the lower courts, in a case where Justice Antonin Scalia refused to recuse him-
self after going on a duck hunting trip with Cheney. And, of course, so all is not
forgotten, the Supreme Court gave us the Bush administration in the first place
in the strangely reasoned case of Bush v. Gore.5' Congress will have to protect
itself. Byrd thinks they are losing the battle, sometimes with self-inflicted
wounds.
44 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
45 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
46 Id. at 508.
47 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
48 See also, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds the
extended detention of an American citizen).
49 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-702 (D.D.C. January 18, 2005).
50 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
51 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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